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COASTAL ZONING*

In today's atmosphere of environmental awareness, protection of the coastal wetlands seems appropriate for many
reasons. The wetlands include much of the most aesthetically
pleasing areas in the United States, while also being a
source of recreation and enjoyment. Man has long had an
economic interest in the valuable iatural resources, minerals
The result is a conglomerate
and fish which the wetlands yield.

of conflicting demands upon the wetlands. The situation begs
for definition and control of these interests so that the full
potential of the coast can be realized.
Zoning has often been suggested as a means to protect
the coastal wetlands. 2 Many states have passed "enabling
legislation" authorizing cities and towns to regulate the
use of land through zoning. 3 Certainly coastal zoning would
appear to be more economically feasible than other methods
of control such as condemnation.
While attempts to employ coastal zoning are relatively
new, many of the older problems first met by inland zoning
reoccur. The major restrictions on zoning appear to be that
zonal boundaries must not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or
discriminatory. Zoning regulations must be constitutional,
with particular emphasis placed on the due process, equal
protection and supremacy clauses in the examination of the
regulations.4 Justice Holmes sounded the warning in 1922
*

See Headnotes

1. See generally U. S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE CIRC.,
WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES 39 (1956).
2. See generally VIRGINIA INSTITUTE OF MARINE SCIENCE,
COASTAL WETLANDS OF VIRGINIA (1969).
3. See generally C. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING 51-106 (3d ed. 1956); E. YOKELY, ZONING LAW AND
PRACTICE § 25.47-51 (3d ed. 1965); U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE,
A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (1926) is the original
model used by many states.
4. Dunham, Flood Control via the Police Powers, 107
U.Pa.L. Rev. 1098 (1959).
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by saying
[wie are in danger of forgetting that a strong
public desire to improve the public condition is
not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the Constitutional way of paying
for the change. 5
While these problems are important, there are other
problems faced by coastal zoning which are perhaps unique.
Coastlines are elusive and difficult to determine. They are
subject to both natural and man-made changes. They may
change from hour to hour, making it virtually impossible to
use them as a baseline for zoning. 6 It should also be noted
that the proximity of wetlands to navigable waters presents
certain problems.
Statutes as well as case law indicate that states have
the power to authorize coastal zoning. 7 The United States
Supreme Court held in 1916 that states reserve the right to
establish for themselves such property rules as may be deemed
necessary with respect to water and land within their
boundaries.8 In 1924 a Florida court went further and held
that title to marshlands which were subject to tidal overflow
and shoal waters of bays and inland waterways was vested in
the respective states, and that the states' control was
subject only to the federal government's supremacy over

5. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416
(1922).
6. City of Rye v. Boardman, 11 Misc. 2d 293, 171 N.Y.S.2d
885 (1958) held that no permit was required from the city to
install a system of floats and piles for mooring boats where
the zoning map showed that the boundary terminated at the
shoreline.
7. See 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301, 1311; 33 U.S.C.A. § 403
bestowing to States the rights and ownership of the lands
beneath navigable waters extending three miles from the
coastline, subject to the Federal Government's supremacy
over navigation.
8. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1916).

128

navigation.9 Indeed, today wetland zoning has been tried
in no less than ten coastal states I0 and various local
communities. 1 1 Most of these attempts have met with failure
12
because of Constitutional defects in the proposed statutes.
I

The power to zone coastal wetlands is potentially much
greater than the power to zone the inlands. When use of the
coastlands is restricted, access to the coastal waters is also
restricted.
In 1967 Maine passed the Wetlands Act, which required
permission from the Board before any alteration of the
coastline would be allowed. The Board had the power to
withhold its permission if the proposed action "would threaten
the public safety, health or welfare, would adversely affect
the value or enjoyment of the property of abutting owners,
would be damaging to the conservation of public or private
water supplies or of wildlife or freshwater estuarine or
marine fisheries. ''1 3 Just three years later, however,- the
Board's denial of permission to fill coastal salt marshes
which were considered a valuable natural resource was held
14
to be a taking of private land.
Massachusetts has experienced similar difficulties in
protecting its coastal wetlands. When a real estate developer
was denied permission to fill coastal marshland for a building

9. State v. City of Tampa, 88 Fla. 196, 102 So. 336 (1924).
10. Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, Texas,
California and Washington have attempted to use some form of
zoning legislation to protect their coastal wetlands.
11. It was held in McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach,
41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
817 (1954), that localities which have shorelines may protect
them by restricting their use, provided that they do not deny
land owners all profitable use of their property. The use of
the police power to restrict the use of beach land was upheld.
12. Cases cited notes 14-18 infra, and accompanying text.
13. Wetlands Act 12 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4702 (1967).
14. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
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project the court again recalled the warning of Holmes and
held that "an unrecognized taking in the guise of regulation
15
is worse than confiscation."
The primary purposes of a zoning ordinance passed by a
township in New Jersey restricting the use of swampland were
the retention of land in its natural state, the creation of
a flood water detention basin, and the preservation of wetland wildlife sanctuaries. Application of the ordinance was
16
held to be an unconstitutional taking.
The court in MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury
said,
. . . preservation of privately owned land in its

natural, unspoiled state for the enjoyment and benefit
of the public by preventing the owner from using it
for any practical purpose is not within the scope and
limits of any power or authority
delegated to municipalities
17
Act.
Enabling
under the Zoning
By dicta it added that other methods should be used to
preserve the wetlands.
18
In Dooley v. Town Zoning Commission
the town of
Fairfield, Connecticut made a flood plain zone of an area
previously designated for residential use. The new
regulation was held to be so unreasonable and confiscatory
as to be an unconstitutional taking of private property
for public use. 1 9 The typical judicial approach to zoning
cases is exemplified in Associate Justice Shea's opinion.
This argument is that all property is held by individuals
subject to the limited police power of the state to regulate
the use of such property in a rational manner and whin

15. Comm'r of Natural Resources v. Volpe, 349 Mass. 104,
206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
16. Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of
Parsippany-Troy Hills,40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
17. MacGibbon v. Bd. of Appeals of Duxbury, 255 N.E.2d
347, 351 (1970).
18. Dooley v. Town Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197
A.2d 770 (1964).
19. Id.
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constitutional limits. However, when this police power is used
in a sufficiently broad manner it becomes, in effect, an
exercise of the power of eminent domain, which should require
payment of compensation to the owner. Associate Justice
Shea goes on to conclude:
The important question to be decided then is
whether the situation is one which allows regulation
through the process of zoning under the exercise of
police power or whether the regulations adopted are
so unreasonable and confiscatory as to constitute for
all practical purposes a taking of private property
for public use.

Relevant to this determination

is the extent to which property values are diminished
by the zoning change and its relationship to 2 the
0
health, safety and welfare of the community.
Upon completing the analysis of Fairfield's zoning
ordinance, the court concluded that plaintiff's realty had
been rendered useless, and the ordinance therefore was
unreasonable and confiscatory in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 1 The ordinance 2 2 had attempted to zone a flood
plain by restricting it to uses such as parks, playgrounds,
marinas, boathouses, docks, clubhouses, wildlife sanctuaries,
and farming which, with respect to plaintiff's land, were
23
impractical and greatly reduced its value.
A zoning act regulating land use to fulfill a public
purpose will not for that reason alone be declared valid.24
In reviewing problems involving private land zoning, most
courts show a concern for the balance between reduction
in value of the individual's land and the interest which
the general welfare has gained.2 5 Other cases, however,
20. Id. at 772.
21. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV.
22. Fairfield, Conn., Ordinance for Flood Plain Zoning,
Sept. 1960.
23. Dooley, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964).
24. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
25. City of Little Rock v. Parker, 241 Ark. 381, 407 S.W.2d
921 (1966); Urann v. Hinsdale, 30 Ill.2d 170, 195 N.E.2d
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reject the balancing technique and hold that exclusive
application of this approach does not yield sufficient
grounds to determine the outcome of zoning litigation.26
When an individual's land has been rendered useless
27
the ordinance will be held unreasonable and confiscatory,
as in Dooley, and the state is faced with a dilemma.
The law may be held to be void and unconstitutional and
therefore not effectively achieve the objectives of wetland
protection through environmental control of plaintiff's
land. Yet the resultant taking through eminent domain,
which is essential to the accomplishment of the purposes
under the ordinance, requires just compensation to the
property owner. 2 8 Should the municipality choose to pursue
its program further through eminent domain, the treasury
may well be depleted and funds allocated. Substantially
increased costs would tend to bring about political conflicts
from interest groups and to negate the benefits of using the
police power to afford protection for coastal areas. Therefore,
the effort to control the land-sea interface through zoning
without the cost burden of eminent domain requires the
construction and implimentation of local ordinances sufficient
for the purposes intended, free from constitutional prohibitions,
and acceptable within the judicial doctrines of the times.

643 (1964); La Salle Nat'l Bank v. Chicago, 5 Ill.2d 344, 125
N.E.2d 609 (1955); Shepard v. Skaneateles, 300 N.Y. 115, 89
N.E.2d 619 (1949); Kanefield v. Skokie, 56 Ill. App.2d 472, 206
N.E.2d 447 (1965); Udell v. McFadyen, 40 Misc. 2d 265, 243 N.Y.S.2e
156 (1963).
26. Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy
Hills Tp., 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); Vernon Park Realty,
Inc. v. City of Mt. Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954);
Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d
587 (1938); Schwartz v. Lee, 50 Misc. 2d 533, 270 N.Y.S.2d
855 (1966).
27. See also Duclos v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 101 R.I.
537, 225 A.2d 520 (1967); Dubois v. zoning Bd. of Review,
101 R.I. 461, 224 A.2d 606 (1966); Fryer v. City of New
Albany, 135 Ind. App. 454, 194 N.E.2d 417 (1963).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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The objectives of these programs can be adopted by
federal, state and local authorities after comprehensive
study through appointed agencies. 2 9 The legal implimentation
of policies pursuing these agreed upon goals then becomes
the province of law study groups and legislative bodies.
Their quest is for a form of zoning ordinance which can
withstand constitutional examination.
It is from the enabling act that the localtiv gains
the power to control coastal land use by zoning, 3 0 but this
power is necessarily subject to certain limitations and
restrictions. 3 1 The state law usually gives the purposes
and reasons for which localities may adopt ordinances. These
laws may provide for variances within zoning ordinances and
at the same time delegate the authority to make exceptions
through permits, upon review and hearing of individual
applicants. A variance is an authorization of a land use
which is prohibited by a zoning ordinance. 3 2 It is "designed
as an escape hatch from the literal terms of the ordinances
which if strictly applied would deny a property owner all
beneficial use of his land and amount to a confiscation."3 3
This has been upehld as a means of accomplishing the desired
objectives where a unique case
34 of practical difficulty or
occurs.
hardship
unnecessary

29. In Virginia an example of such is the Virginia
Institute of Marine Science, directed by House Joint
Resolution 69 of the 1968 General Assembly

". . . to make

a study and report on all marshlands and wetlands in the State.
30. McCarthy, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954).
31. For example, a state is not amenable to the zoning
ordinances of its political subdivisions, Town of Bloomfield v.
N.J. Highway Authority, 18 N.J. 237, 113 A.2d 658 (1955).
32. See generally Reed v. Bd. of Standards and Appeals,
255 N.Y. 126, 174 N.E. 301 (1931); Foland v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals, 26 Misc. 2d 1093, 207 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1960).
33. Lincourt v. zoning Bd. of Review, 98 R.I. 305, 201
A.2d 482, 483 (1964).
34. Stacy v. Montgomery County, 239 Md. 189, 210 A.2d
540 (1965).
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This approach to zoning employs the local administrative
agency to pass upon variances and is extremely important to
the effectiveness of coastal zoning. The advantage is
evident. The entire land-sea interface, by whatever definition,
encompasses a highly volitile, continually changing area. The
effects of botanic mutation, tides, chemical changes, and
"acts of God" require that the conventional approaches to
static land zoning be replaced by more responsive and
sensitive arrangements. This calls for administrators and
agencies at local levels to review policy decisions, to
receive and decide upon application for variances, and to
issue special permits. The local bodies afford a closer scrutiny
of the problems, are more aware of the environmental needs,
and are better able to define immediate objectives.
The use of adminirative agencies to impliment zoning
restrictions has been widely advocated, but in the case of
coastal zoning, where a wide latitude of discretion is
required, an additional legal complexity develops--namely,
the encouragement of litigation which results from a vesting of
such power in an administrative body. This thorn, and the
demand for preset regulations, can be related in part to the
fact that current enabling legislation adheres to a division
between legislative and administrative functions. 3 5 Such a
division at the local level is not dictated by any consitutional
36
requirement.
Any delegation of a quasi-judicial power to a municipal
administrative body must include guidelines for the use of its
discretion. The adherence to separation of powers, enshrined
in much of today's enabling legislation, must be changed in
order to pass the necessary power of discretion to administrative
boards and realize effective environmental programs. This
would require a substantially different attitude from that
found in conventional zoning statutes. There would be no
distinct boundaries and no fixed zoning map, but rather the
enabling act would set forth a comprehensive plan expressed

35. KRASNOWLECKI, THE CHALLENGE OF PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT, (Regional Plan Association Zoning Bull. No. 114 Feb.
1965).
36. Madnelker, Delegation of Power and Function in Zoning
Administration, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 60.
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in terms of environmental zones. Definitions would be in
graphis form and in statements of development and conservation
objectives. Other guidelines for discretionary action would
relate to the public good as a rule of conduct and the
adoption of performance standards for wetlands use rather than
rigid specifications. Employing guidelines expressed in terms
of explicit objectives would be sufficient to limit discretion
and at the same time provide for a more efficient approach by
localities to their programs. 37
This concept of adequate standards is applied in part
to several recent items of federal legislation. 3 8 A trend

37. Paper presented at the 1964 ASPO National Planning
Conference, American Society of Planning Officials.
38. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1277(c)
(1968) says,
In order to carry out the provisions of this subsection
the appropriate Secretary shall issue guidelines,
specifying standards for local zoning ordinances, which
are consistent with the purposes of this chapter. The
standards specified in such guidelines shall have the
object of (A) prohibiting new commercial or industrial
uses which are consistent with the purposes of the chapter
and (B) the protection of the banklands by means of
acreage, frontage and setback requirements on
development.
The Wilderness

Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1133(b) (1964) says,

Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, each
agency administering any area designated as wilderness
shall be responsible for preserving the wilderness
character of the area and shall so administer such area
for such other purposes for which it may have been
established as also to preserve its wilderness
character. Except as otherwise provided in this
chapter, wilderness areas shall be devoted to the
public purposes of recreational, scenic, scientific,
educational, conservation and historical use.
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toward the use of performance standards can be deduced from
these acts. Unfortunately, case law has had little time to
develop, and the question of judicial approval remains to be
determined. Possibly an aid in reaching conclusions favorable
to local ordinances will be found in the dicta of older zoning
cases such as Burnham v. Board of Appeals of Gloucester, where
the court said, . . ."[t]he degree of certainty with which

standards for the exercise of discretion are set up must
39
necessarily depend on the subject matter and the circumstances."
Thg0 problem of ineffective drafting is exemplified by
Dooley.'
A confiscatory taking resulted from the inability
of the private owner to find a reasonable use for his land
from among.those authorized by the statute. A drafting
failure here could easily have been eliminated to retain
the effectiveness of the statute.' One writer has noted in
reference to the case,
The point to be made is that the drafters of the.
ordinance did not sufficiently enumerate permitted
profitable uses. Possible additional uses for this
area might have been golf courses, picnic grounds,
skeet shooting ranges, transient amusement enterprises,
storage yards for scrap metal, roadside stands for the
sale of food or fishing bait, riding stables, etc. It
is not enough for the municipality to say that a
variance probably would be granted if application
were made for such a use. As here, a court may strike

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act 33 U.S.C.A. § 1160
(c) (3) (1970) provides that,
Standards of quality established pursuant to this
subsection shall be such as to protect the public
health or welfare, enhance the quality of water and
serve the purposes of this Act. In establishing such
standards the [agency] shall take into consideration
their use value for public water supplies, propagation
of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes and agricultural, industrial and other legitimate uses.
Although these Acts are not zoning ordinances per se, they
do delegate to agencies the guidelines for the administration
of environmental legislation.
39. Burnham v. Bd. of Appeals of Gloucester, 333 Mass.
114, 118, 128 N.E.2d 772, 775 (1955).
40. Dooley, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964).
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the ordinance as a whole if the listed permitted uses
41
are inadequate.
Massachusetts has successfully avoided the coastal
zoning dilemma faced by the Connecticut Commissioner by
incorporating into the enabling statute--(a) the right to
purchase the parcel declared subject to an unreasonable exercise
of police power and (b) the limitation that any such finding
shall not affect any other land than that of the petitioner.
This allows the municipality to purchase through eminent
domain and to hold the land for the purposes of the act.
Although this requires an expenditure, the objectives of
the environmental program are not frustrated by a striking
of the statute.
Using this technique does not, however, insure the
success of the coastal protection program. A new problem
becomes manifest when local subdivisions-are faced with
a choice between retaining their broad tax base afforded by
industry and, on the other hand, authorizing condemnatiin
expenditures necessary to implement the zoning plan. Even
43
in New York, where the state provides 50% of the funding,
cities have not responded favorably when forced to choose
between control over revenue-producing entities and over
A
conserved wetlands.
Pennsylvania has a sound approach to the problem. In
the event that coastal zoning fails because of a violation
of due process, the resulting costs are distributed among
the public through the issuance of public conservation bonds.
In order to reduce the expense, the property may be offered
for resale subject to conservation easements or restrictive use
covenants. 4 5 Realty use then conforms within the purposes of
the zoning ordinance, expense has been minimized, and because
the public bonds have placed the burden upon the population,
the municipality is partially relieved of its financial

41. Beuchert, Recent Natural Resources Cases, 4 NATURAL
RESOURCES 3. 445, 447 (1965).
42. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, § 105 (1971).
43. Long Island Wetland Bill, N. Y. CONSERV. L. § 394
(McKinney 1967).
44.

J. CLARK, CONFLICT IN THE ATLANTIC ESTUARIES, (Am.

Littorial Soc. Publications No. 5 1967).
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5007-13 (1968).
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dilemma. The public's resolve and interest in the conservation
effort can be measured directly by their willingness to sustain
such a bond market.
The Pennsylvania approach to the fiscal problems of
conservation zoning may have substantially different effects
from state to state, especially when applied to coastal
areas. This may occur where powerful private groups exist
and seek interests in vast lengths of the coast line.
Delaware and New Jersey naturally expect opposition from oil
and chemical companies which own large portions of the landsea interface. In Delaware approximately 40,000 acres along
the coast are owned by these corporations. Of the 75,000
remaining, approximately 60,000 now belong to conservation
groups, including the state. 4 6 Zoning to effect future
dredging, filling, and shipping functions will create
problems. The implimentation of successful coastal zoning
in these states will require programs that encourage the
direct intervention of private interests pursuing the .same
objectives as those set out in the zoning program. Policies
favoring conservation groups that may acquire lands will
counterbalance the efforts of organized non-conforming users.
Restrictionsmay not, however, be imposed upon land owners
primarily for the purpose of depressing the value of their
realty so that it may be purchased later at a modest price.
47
This type of zoning is clearly confiscatory and invalid.
Individual and private conservation groups must be stimulated
by programs complimentary to coastal zoning in order to
achieve the greatest possible results.
Wetland zoning is still in its infancy and, literally,
has many rivers yet to cross. It may be that judicial
attitudes will, in the end, play the largest part. The call
for regulation and the seriousness of the alternatives require
that new approaches to zoning be welcomed. Perhaps the
words of Chief Judge John R. Brown in Zabel v. Tabb4 are a

46. G. SPINNER, A PLAN FOR THE MARINE RESOURCES OF THE
ATLANTIC COASTAL ZONE 49 (1969).
47. Morris County, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
48. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3356 (1971).
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premonitory sign:
[t]he establishment was entitled, if not required, to
consider ecological factors and, being persuaded by
them, to deny that which might have been granted routinely
five, ten, or fifteen years ago before man's explosive
increase made all, including Congress, aware of
civilization's potential destruction from breathing
its own polluted air and drinking its own infected
water and the immeasurable loss from a silent-spring
like disturbance of nature's economy.
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